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Summary
On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to reduce
U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,000 operationally deployed
warheads.  He noted that he would make these reductions unilaterally, without
pursuing a formal arms control agreement with Russia.  President Putin welcomed the
proposed reductions, but argued that they should be made through a formal treaty.
Officials in the Bush Administration have frequently argued that the United States
should not be bound by many of the formal arms control treaties considered or signed
by previous administrations.  It argues that these agreements do too little to limit
threats to the United States and go too far in restricting U.S. flexibility in ensuring its
national security.  But, the absence of formal arms control treaties would bring about
changes in the role of Congress; the Senate has a constitutionally-mandated role in
giving advice and consent to the ratification of formal treaties but would have no role
in approving informal agreements.  This approach would also change the role of arms
control in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
The United States and Soviet Union used negotiated treaties and unilateral
measures to reduce their nuclear forces.  The START I Treaty, which reduced
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and START II Treaty, which did not enter  into
force, are examples of the former; the 1991 Presidential nuclear  initiatives, which
eliminated non-strategic nuclear weapons, are an example of the latter.  A review of
these cases highlights relative strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms.
Formal treaties allow the participants to understand and predict future changes in
forces and threats, allow for transparency in monitoring those forces, and allow for
balanced and equitable trades between the forces of the participating parties.  On the
other hand, the search for balanced trades and the need for detailed definitions tends
to lengthen the negotiating process, while the detailed provisions and requirements
lengthen and add to the cost of the implementation process.  Unilateral measures, on
the other hand, can be devised and implemented more quickly, allow for more
“sweeping changes,” and provide the participants with the flexibility to reverse their
reductions, if necessary. However, they often do not provide transparency or
predictability, and there is the potential for destabilizing reversals.
The Bush Administration’s proposals demonstrates many, but not all of these
characteristics.  The President announced his proposed reductions relatively quickly,
but he plans to implement them at a slow pace, over 10 years.  And, although his
reductions appear to move well beyond those implemented under START I, they are
no more “sweeping” than reductions that have been considered for the past 10 years
under START II and a potential START III Treaty.  The President did not propose
any new monitoring measures, but the United States and Russia are likely to continue
to implement the monitoring regime from START I to improve transparency with
future reductions.  Finally, the President and his advisers have highlighted the fact that
these measures will provide the United States with the flexibility to reduce or restore
its forces quickly.  Russia, on the other hand, may feel threatened by the U.S. ability
to reverse its weapons reductions.  And, without precise definitions of those weapons
that will be eliminated, disputes and suspicion could arise in the future. 
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Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear
Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions
Introduction
The United States and Soviet Union signed numerous treaties and agreements
that were designed to limit, reduce, and sometimes eliminate offensive nuclear
weapons. Some critics claimed the agreements did little to enhance U.S. security –
they either did not limit the threat from the Soviet Union while constraining U.S.
forces or they restrained weapons that the nations had already decided they did not
need to maintain their security.   Nevertheless, these agreements, and the negotiations
that produced them, often played a central role and served to measure the level of
tension in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union.  The United
States and Russia did not sign any new agreements during the Clinton Administration,
but the arms control process continued with the implementation of the 1991 START
I (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, the debate over START II, and preliminary
discussions on a START III Treaty.1
During the election campaign in 2000 and his early months in office in 2001,
President Bush pledged to set aside the arms control negotiating process and to
reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces unilaterally, to the “lowest possible number
consistent with our national security.”  The depth of the reductions would be
determined by a review conducted by the Secretary of Defense, but the President
expected that the United States could reduce its forces “significantly” below the
START II level “without compromising our security in any way.”2  This approach to
weapons reductions reflected the President and his advisers’ views on the relatively
low value of negotiated arms control and the need to alter the U.S.-Russian
relationship after the Cold War.  Specifically, the President stated that “we can and
will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that
reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.”3
After receiving the results of the Department of Defense review of U.S. nuclear
forces and nuclear posture, President Bush announced his plans for reductions in U.S.
nuclear forces during a summit meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in
CRS-2
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6Ibid.
7Williams, Daniel.  Russia to Cut Its Nuclear Stockpile; Putin Decides to Shift Funds to
Rebuild Conventional Forces.  Washington Post.  August 13, 2000. p. A16.  See, also,
Wolfsthal, John Brook, Cristina-Astrid Chuen, and Emily Ewell Daughtry, editors.  Nuclear
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Union.  Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.  June 2000.  p. 35.
8The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.  Press Conference.  President Bush and
President Putin Discuss New Relationship.  November 13, 2001.
Washington, on November 13, 2001.  He stated that the United States would reduce
its “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and
2,200 over the next decade.”  This number falls below the 3,000-3,500 warheads that
would have been permitted by the 1993 START II Treaty, and, on its face, goes
below the 2,000-2,500 warheads planned for START III.  However, because the
START Treaties use counting rules to attribute warheads to the parties’ forces, and
because these counting rules could include weapons that are not “operationally
deployed,” the President’s decision may reduce U.S. forces to levels similar to those
that would have been consistent with START III.4 
The President indicated that the United States would reduce its forces
unilaterally, without signing a formal agreement with Russia.  He stated that “a new
relationship based upon trust and cooperation is one that doesn’t need endless hours
of arms control discussions... We don’t need arms control negotiations to reduce our
weaponry in a significant way.”5  He did, however, agree to put something in writing,
although he remains opposed to formal negotiations on a formal treaty.
President Putin offered a mixed response.  He stated that he appreciated the
President’s decision to reduce U.S. strategic offensive weapons and noted that Russia
“will try to respond in kind.”6  He did not offer any specific numbers on this occasion,
but he has, in the past, proposed that the United States and Russia reduce their
strategic offensive forces to 1,500 warheads or fewer.  Many experts believe that
Russia is likely to retain only 1,000-1,500 warheads by the end of the decade, and that
it will lack the economic resources to produce more than a few hundred new land-
based missiles and, perhaps, a few new ballistic missile submarines.7
President Putin has stated, however, that he would like to use the formal arms
control process to reduce U.S. and Russia forces.  He emphasized that the U.S.-
Russian dialogue on strategic offensive and defensive weapons should focus on
“reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement on further reductions of the U.S. and
Russian weapons.”  He added that Russia was prepared to “present all our agreements
in a treaty form, including the issues of verification and control.”8
This exchange during the Washington summit highlighted an ongoing debate –
within the Administration, among analysts, and between the United States and Russia
CRS-3
9Rice, Condoleeza.  Promoting the National Interest.  Foreign Affairs.  January/February
2000. pp. 47-48.
10Bush Administration Reviewing the Value of Arms Control Agreements.
InsideDefense.com. August 28, 2001.
11The United States signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972 and ratified
it in 1975.  Since 1994, the BWC’s Ad Hoc Group of Experts has been negotiating a protocol
on verification and compliance; it completed its work in 2001. President Bush has stated that
the United States will not sign the Protocol, in spite of growing concerns about the potential
for biological weapons use by terrorists.  The Administration argues that it will be too
intrusive for U.S. industry and that it will do little to detect or deter cheating in other nations.
See U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Biological Weapons: A
Primer.  CRS Report RL31059.  By Stephen R. Bowman.  July 24, 2001.
12The United States signed the CTBT in 1996.  The Senate refused to give its advice and
consent to ratification in October 1999. The Bush Administration has indicated that it will not
ask the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification; it did not participate in a November
2001 U.N. conference on the Treaty; and, although it has pledged to maintain the ongoing
moratorium on testing, it maintains that the United States has a right to resume testing to
ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons.  See CRS Issue Brief IB92099,
Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, by Jonathan Medalia.  Updated
Regularly.
– about the relative strengths and weaknesses of unilateral reductions and bilateral
arms control agreements.  Officials in the Bush Administration have  questioned the
value of formal arms control agreements.  Following a general discussion of these
views, the report examines strengths and weakness often attributed to these two
forms of arms control.  It concludes with review of the Bush Administration’s
proposals to identify how they incorporate some strengths and accept some
weaknesses of unilateral arms reductions.
Changing U.S. Policy and Priorities
Bush Administration Views on Arms Control
Multilateral Regimes.  The President and others in his Administration have
argued that bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties do not necessarily serve
U.S. national interests.  In an article published during the campaign, Condoleeza Rice,
the National Security Adviser, suggested that the United States “has a special role in
the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that
someone thinks to propose.”9  Administration officials claim that they do not oppose
all agreements, but that it will review them “on a case-by-case” basis and reject them
if they place undue constraints on the United States without doing much to limit the
threats to the United States.10  These considerations have led the Administration to
reject several multilateral treaty regimes, including the Protocol to the Biological
Weapons Convention11 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.12
The Bush Administration has not criticized or backed away from the 1968
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  This Treaty does not, however, restrict the U.S.
CRS-4
13Bush Administration Reviewing Value of Arms Control Agreements.  InsideDefense.com.
August 28, 2001.
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nuclear weapons program and many analysts believe it has been relatively successful
in establishing an international norm that limits the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Bilateral Treaties.  Administration officials have argued against the
negotiation of new bilateral arms control agreements, in part, because they believe the
process can be too slow and too rigid.  Specifically, according to one official, “formal
arms control agreements that require so much time to negotiate and are negotiated at
a level of detail that has become astounding... will not allow us to make the kinds of
adjustments to our own forces in the timeframes we need to make them.”13  In
contrast, according to Administration officials, unilateral measures would allow the
United States to reduce its forces quickly when they were no longer needed and
restore forces quickly if conditions changed again.
This view represents a sharp departure from policies supported by Republicans
and conservatives, including many who work  in the Bush Administration, for much
of the Cold War.  During that time, many argued that arms control agreements must
include detailed definitions and provisions. They also insisted on complex monitoring
and verification regimes that would permit the United States to detect a full range of
possible violations.  This approach would assure Soviet compliance with  obligations,
even if it produced lengthy negotiations and long, complex treaties.
The Bush Administration has argued, however, that arms control negotiations
represent an adversarial process between the United States and Russia and they are
no longer appropriate because, according to the President and others in his
Administration, “Russia is no longer our enemy.”14  Accordingly, the two nations
should work together to lessen or eliminate threats to their security, rather than
pursue agreements based on the premise that each is a threat to the other.  For many
months, the Administration’s critics questioned this view, noting that the United
States and Russia continued to deploy enough nuclear  weapons to destroy the other
and to posture those weapons in ways that threatened targets in the other nation.
They argued that the political relationship may have improved, but it could deteriorate
again in the future.  However, after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, Russia and the United States opened new channels of
communication and cooperation.  Some assert that this new relationship truly does
seem to signify a change in the security environment for both nations and a real
reduction in the need for and role of arms control in their relationship.
In the Administration’s view, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty embodies all
the negative characteristics of formal arms control.  It constrains the U.S. ability to
develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses, without controlling the capabilities of
potential adversaries who might develop ballistic missiles.  It is not appropriate to the
new relationship between the United States and Russia.  Because it embodies a
“bargain” where each side pledges not to develop defenses so that the other can be
assured of an effective retaliatory attack, it assumes that the United States and Russia
are adversaries poised to engage in a massive nuclear war.  Hence, the Administration
CRS-5
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would like to replace the ABM Treaty with a new strategic framework that allows for
ongoing consultation and cooperation without codifying limits on U.S. or Russian
offensive or defensive weapons in a formal treaty.
Arms Control without Treaties
Although the Bush Administration has agreed to outline its arms reduction plans
in a written agreement, it seems unlikely that the United States and Russia will sign
a new, formal arms control treaty.   The two nations could still cooperate in reducing
their strategic offensive nuclear weapons, provide each other with information about
their plans and programs, and, possibly, employ some cooperative monitoring
measures to help each nation confirm changes in the other’s forces.  This type of arms
control process may differ from the formal negotiations and treaty-defined
implementation rules of the Cold War era in the following ways:  
The Role of Congress.  The U.S. Constitution states that the President “shall
have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”15  Consequently, the President
cannot sign and implement an arms control treaty that would limit or reduce U.S.
nuclear weapons without gaining the approval of at least 67 Senators.  He can,
however, limit or reduce U.S. nuclear forces without seeking the advice and consent
of the Senate if he does so unilaterally.  In such a circumstance, he would act, as
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military, to establish U.S. military doctrine, policy,
and force structure in accordance with his views on U.S. national security.
Congress would, nevertheless, have an opportunity to review and vote on the
President’s plans through the annual Authorization and Appropriations Bills for the
Department of Defense.  If Congress did not approve of plans to reduce U.S. nuclear
weapons, it could deny the use of appropriated funds for activities that would
deactivate or dismantle specified weapons systems.  Congress employed this
mechanism in FY1998, when it mandated that funds “available to the Department of
Defense may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 for retiring or
dismantling, or for preparing to retire or dismantle” nuclear weapons below specified
levels that were consistent with the START I Treaty.16  Initially, this legislation was
designed to provide the Russian parliament with an incentive to approve the START
II Treaty because it clearly stated that U.S. forces would not decline further until
START II entered into force.  The Clinton Administration sought to ease the
restriction in subsequent years as the budgetary cost to retain aging systems increased.
But many in Congress believed the Clinton Administration might go too far in
reducing U.S. nuclear weapons so Congress included similar provisions in the Defense
Authorization Bills for FY1999, FY2000, and FY2001.  It did, however, repeal this
language for the Bush Administration in the FY2002 Defense Bill.
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The Role of Arms Control.  During the 1990s, as the relationship between
the United States and Russia improved, their cooperation expanded to include a wide
range of economic, political, and military issues.  However, even without a new treaty
since January 1993, arms control has remained on their cooperative agenda.  They
have worked together to implement START I, sharing data and cooperating in a
range of on-site inspections, and they sought to reach agreement on further
reductions.  Arms control also remained important to Russia as a measure of its
political status.  As Russia experienced economic and political disruptions during the
1990s, its nuclear weapons were often seen as its sole remaining claim to superpower
status.  Therefore, negotiations with the United States to limit and reduce those
weapons were seen as a measure of Russia’s status as an equal to the United States.
During the 1990s, however, many analysts inside and outside government grew
convinced that the United States no longer needed arms control to limit the Russian
threat.  They expected Russian forces to decline sharply, under economic pressure,
as Russia retired older systems without producing large numbers of new weapons.
Therefore, the United States would not need to limit its own forces in an effort to
convince Russia to reduce its arsenal.  Furthermore, arms control may become less
important in Russia’s measure of its relationship with the United States as other
economic and political issues take a central role on their agenda for discussions.
Changing Priorities.  The Administration’s preference for unilateral
reductions in nuclear weapons also exhibits a change in priorities for U.S. nuclear
force planning.  In the past, arms control offered a measure of predictability,
providing the United States and Russia with information about the capabilities of
existing nuclear weapons and plans for future forces.  The level of detail in this
information increased sharply in the late 1980s and 1990s, as agreements such as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the START I Treaty mandated
extensive data exchanges and allowed for frequent on-site inspections.
Although the United States and Russia might employ some of these cooperative
measures as they reduce their forces in the future, the Bush Administration has
indicated that it places a higher priority on maintaining U.S. flexibility.  Without
formal treaty limits, the United States could reduce or restore its forces quickly.  This
is important because, according to the Administration, we live in an unpredictable
world, where threats can emerge and recede rapidly and static, predictable forces may
stand in the way of an appropriate response.17
Questions and Concerns
Some Members of Congress and analysts outside government have raised
questions about the Bush Administration’s policy and priorities on arms control.
Some have questioned whether the President has the authority to reduce U.S. nuclear
weapons without consulting Congress.  Others have questioned whether this approach
will produce stability and security in the long run.  They note that Russia and the
United States will maintain sizeable nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future, and
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20A Protocol signed in 1992 named Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as the
successors to the Soviet Union for START.  Each of these nations had Soviet strategic
offensive nuclear weapons on their territories.  Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have all
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(continued...)
that they could once again pose a threat to each other if their political relationship
should change.18  Without a formal treaty limiting weapons, either side could restore
weapons to its forces.  Russia may be particularly concerned about the U.S. ability in
this regard because the United States may retain many of the warheads removed from
operationally deployed forces in its stockpile.  Furthermore, without cooperative
monitoring and transparency measures, each side may be uncertain about the
emerging forces of the other. 
Critics also argue that the absence of formal U.S.-Russian agreements could
undermine international stability and other nations’ confidence in their security.
Several of the United States’ allies have expressed their support for a formal arms
control framework, noting that the predictability and transparency inherent in such a
system can ease security concerns among nations who are not direct parties to the
agreement.19  At the same time, some argue that the U.S. disregard for formal treaty
regimes could spread to other nations.  Some might choose to withdraw from other
treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, that the United States deems
to be beneficial.  Also, some argue, potential adversaries, such as China, might expand
their own nuclear forces in response to U.S. programs (see below).  Therefore, critics
assert,  the Bush Administration’s approach could, in the long run, produce reactions
that might undermine U.S. security.
Unilateral and Bilateral Arms Control:
Illustrative Cases
During the past 20 years, the United States has pursued both bilateral arms
control treaties and unilateral, reciprocal reductions with first, the Soviet Union, and
later, Russia.  These include the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START
I and START II), and the unilateral, reciprocal reductions in non-strategic nuclear
weapons (the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives – PNIs) in 1991. These efforts exhibit
many of the characteristics often attributed to unilateral and bilateral arms reductions.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
The Reductions.  The United States and Soviet Union signed the first
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on July 31, 1991.  START I limits the parties20 to
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successor to the Soviet Union.
21Russia eventually ratified the Treaty in April 2000, but it included conditions in its Law on
Ratification that have prevented the Treaty from entering into force.
6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles — land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and heavy bombers.  This represented a reduction of approximately one-
third from the number of weapons the United States and Soviet Union deployed
during the Cold War.  The Treaty assigns a number of warheads to each type of
missile and heavy bomber through counting rules.  Because these counting rules
“discount” the number of weapons that might actually be carried by some types of
bombers, the number of actual warheads deployed by the United States and Russia
could exceed the number of warheads assigned to deployed systems. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led many to conclude
that the number of weapons permitted by START I could be reduced significantly
without harming U.S. national security.  Consequently, the United States and Russia
signed START II on January 3, 1993.  It limits each side to 3,000-3,500 accountable
warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles, a further 50 percent reduction from
START I levels.  The Treaty also bans all multiple warhead ICBMS (MIRVed
ICBMs).  For the most part, START II would use the same verification regime as
START I.  Unlike START I, however, START II includes all the weapons carried on
bombers in its counting rules, so the number of warheads that could be deployed by
the United States and Russia would not exceed the number counted under the Treaty.
Timeframe for Negotiations.  The United States and Soviet Union opened
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in 1982.  The talks stalled in the mid-1980s when
the Soviet Union walked out after the United States deployed intermediate-range
missiles in Europe.  The negotiations resumed in earnest in 1985.  They took another
brief hiatus in early 1989, while the first Bush Administration reviewed U.S. arms
control policy, and concluded in July 1991.  The Treaty entered into force in
December 1994, after Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to return the nuclear
warheads on their territories to Russia and joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
as non-nuclear nations.  The Treaty allows for a 7-year implementation period, which
concluded on December 5, 2001.  Consequently, START I took 16-19 years from the
start of negotiations to the completion of reductions.
The United States and Russia began negotiations on START II in early 1992 and
signed the Treaty in January 1993.  This relatively quick pace reflects, in part, the fact
that START II uses the verification regime from START I.  The Treaty initially called
for the reductions to be complete by the beginning of 2003, a period of ten years after
it was signed.  However, in 1997, the United States and Russia agreed to extend the
elimination period to the end of 2007 because Russia had not yet approved
ratification.21  Hence, even with a relatively short time for negotiation, START II
would have taken 16 years from the beginning of the negotiations to the end of the
eliminations.
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Details in Definitions and Provisions.  The full text of the documents
associated with START I fills 290 pages.  The Treaty itself, which includes the basic
limits on U.S. and Soviet forces and the types of inspections that the parties can use
to monitor compliance with the Treaty limits, is only 16 pages.  However, the
document includes 8 annexes and protocols, along with a number of other associated
agreements and documents.  Each of these documents adds details and complex
procedures to the requirements contained in the basic treaty.  For example, a six-page
Definitions Annex includes 124 detailed definitions of the weapons systems, facilities,
procedures, and other terms in the Treaty.  A seven-page Conversion and Elimination
Protocol outlines the precise procedures that the countries must follow when
eliminating or converting weapons systems so that they will no longer count under the
Treaty.  The 70-page Inspection Protocol identifies the precise procedures and
equipment that must be used before, during, and after the numerous inspections listed
in the Treaty.
In contrast, the START II Treaty contains only 30 pages of documents – the 10-
page basic text, a 7-page Protocol that adds to the provisions in the START I
Treaty’s Protocol on Elimination, a 4-page Protocol outlining the procedures to be
used during the display of heavy bombers, and a Memorandum of Understanding that
contains the data needed to attribute warhead numbers to delivery vehicles.  However,
because much of the detail included in annexes and protocols to START I was to be
used during the implementation of START II, this second Treaty did not need as
much text to impose the same complex definitions and procedures.
The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
The Reductions.  On September 27, 1991, in a speech to the nation, President
George H.W. Bush announced a number of changes he planned to make to the U.S.
nuclear arsenal.22  He stated that the United States would withdraw from deployment
and eliminate all of its land-based non-strategic nuclear weapons (those with ranges
less than 3,600 miles) and withdraw its non-strategic naval nuclear weapons deployed
on attack submarines and surface ships.  Some weapons would be placed in storage
and others would be eliminated.  These measures would affect more than 2,000 land-
based and sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons.  He also announced that he
would remove from alert all U.S. strategic bombers and 450 Minuteman II ICBMs
that were to be eliminated under START II.  He also cancelled several modernization
programs for strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.  He indicated that the
United States would implement these measures regardless of the Soviet reaction, but
he invited Soviet President Gorbachev to take similar steps.
On October 5, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev replied that he, too,
would withdraw and eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons.23  He stated that the
Soviet Union would destroy all nuclear artillery ammunition and warheads for tactical
missiles; remove warheads for nuclear anti-aircraft missiles and destroy some of them;
CRS-10
24These were stored and deployed at hundreds of facilities both in Russia and other Soviet
republics. They may also have lacked the sophisticated command and control devices that
were used on strategic nuclear weapons.  Hence, some analysts feared they might be lost, sold,
or used by unauthorized commanders.
25Handler, Joshua.  The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage, and Security
Aspects of TNWs.  Presentation for seminar at the United Nations, New York, September 24,
2001.
destroy all nuclear land-mines; and remove all naval non-strategic weapons from
submarines and surface ships and ground-based naval aviation, destroying some of
them.  Estimates of the number of non-strategic weapons deployed by the Soviet
Union varied, but many analysts expected these measures to affect several thousand
weapons.  President Gorbachev also announced that he would remove bombers and
more than 500 ballistic missiles from alert and cancel many modernization programs.
Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin pledged to continue implementing these measures
after the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991.
Timeframe for the Reductions.  Although some of the measures announced
by President Bush may have been under review for several months, reports indicate
that the package announced on September 27 had been compiled, reviewed, and
approved in a matter of weeks.  The failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 had
raised concerns about the safety of Soviet non-strategic nuclear weapons.24  Officials
in the Bush Administration hoped that, by announcing withdrawals of U.S. non-
strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would do the same and ease the growing
concerns.  Furthermore, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, much of the rationale
for U.S. deployment of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe had disappeared.
The United States implemented these measures very quickly.  Bombers and
ICBMs were removed from alert status in a matter of days or weeks.  Non-strategic
nuclear weapons were removed from bases in Europe and naval vessels by the end of
1993, two years after the President announced the initiative.  The warhead
dismantlement process may be moving more slowly, but this is due to the limits on
capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas, where the work is done.
It is possible that President Gorbachev compiled his list of measures in the 10
days between the speech by President Bush and his response.  Eliminating the
weapons apparently took a bit longer, however, in part because of the greater number
of weapons involved.  According to some estimates, the naval systems were removed
from deployment by the end of 1993, but the army and air force systems remained in
the field until 1996 and 1997.25   The elimination of warheads may be proceeding far
more slowly because Russia may not have the capacity or funding to dismantle more
than a few hundred warheads each year.
Details in Definitions and Provisions.  The United States and Russia
never codified these reductions in a formal treaty; the presidential speeches are the
primary source of the list of measures adopted by each nation.  As a result, there are
few details available about the types of weapons included in the measures or the
actions taken to deactivate and dismantle those weapons.  There also is little
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unclassified data about the number of weapons eliminated and the number of weapons
remaining outside the scope of the measures, particularly in Russia.
Comparison of Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches
 The discussion that follows provides an in-depth analysis of some of the
characteristics of unilateral and bilateral arms control that are evident in the cases of
the START Treaties and 1991 PNIs.  It divides these characteristics into two groups
– strengths and weaknesses.  In placing characteristics into these groups, this report
seeks to be consistent with U.S. arms control policy during the past 15 years when the
United States sought to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining
stability in the nuclear balance between the United States and Soviet Union or Russia.
The report employs a broad concept for stability – it is assumed to exist when nations
feel confident in their ability to maintain their security (strategic stability); when
nations do not believe they must rapidly build up forces in peacetime to enhance their
security (arms race stability), and when nations do not believe they must strike first
during a crisis to ensure their security or survival (crisis stability).
Bilateral Treaties – Strengths
Predictability.  Many analysts believe that formal arms control negotiations
and the resulting treaties enhance stability because they improve each nation’s  ability
to understand the other’s forces and capabilities and allow both nations to predict how
those forces might change in the future.  During negotiations, the nations may share
details about existing forces and insights into plans for the future so that each can
understand how threats may emerge and evolve.  The limits in an agreement can also
provide each nation with confidence about the future size and capabilities of the other
nation’s forces.  A treaty’s monitoring provisions and detailed restrictions on activities
can also provide the parties with confidence that they will not be surprised by actions
taken by the other nation and that they will have sufficient warning if the other nation
seeks to evade the limits in a treaty.
Some analysts also argue that the predictability offered by arms control treaties
can enhance stability for nations that are not parties to the treaty, and in the
international community at-large.  For example, nations in Europe that are not parties
to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty or the START Treaties can still
be confident that the Treaty has reduced, and in some cases eliminated, missiles that
had threatened their territories.  The 1972 ABM Treaty is also often cited as an
example of the benefits of predictability.  Although the Treaty only affects missile
defense programs in the United States and Russia, nations such as China may believe
that its missiles could deter an attack by the United States because the United States
cannot deploy defenses sufficient to intercept a retaliatory attack.  From this
perspective, the ABM Treaty may enhance stability between the United States and
China.  Furthermore, if the Treaty did not exist, China might feel compelled to expand
its offensive forces to penetrate U.S. defenses.  But an expansion in Chinese forces
could undermine India’s confidence in its ability to deter China, leading to an
expansion in India’s forces.  And an expansion in India’s forces could raise concerns
and possibly lead to an arms build-up in Pakistan.
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Others, however, dispute the view that U.S-Russian arms control treaties affect
international stability.  Specifically many argue that China might modernize its nuclear
arsenal regardless of U.S. missile defense plans and that India and Pakistan would
alter their forces in response to their security needs vis-a-vis each other, with little
attention paid to a global balance that included U.S. missile defenses.
Transparency.  The arms control process has played a key role in providing
the participating nations with access to and an understanding of the military forces and
activities of the other participants.  During the 1970s, the United States and Russia
relied almost exclusively on their own national technical means (NTM) to monitor
forces and activities limited by arms control agreements.  These included the satellites
and remote sensing technologies that each nation employed to monitor the other,
regardless of arms control obligations.  Beginning in 1987, with the INF Treaty, the
parties also added extensive data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections to
their mechanisms for monitoring forces and verifying compliance with arms control
treaties.   Many viewed these measures as a way to build trust, foster cooperation, and
confirm information already collected by NTM. They created a degree of openness
and transparency that is now a familiar characteristic of the arms control process.
The United States and Russia could build openness and transparency without the
presence of formal arms control treaties.  The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program (CTR), which the United States is using to assist Russia with
transportation, storage and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles
provides the United States with access to a wide range of military activities, facilities,
and weapons systems in Russia.26   However, cooperation and transparency in the
CTR program has limits.  Russia is unwilling to allow the United States access to
many of its nuclear facilities and Russia has no access to U.S. nuclear facilities or
weapons through this program. 
Balance and Equality.  When negotiating formal treaties, the United States
and Soviet Union sought provisions that appeared balanced and equal, in spite of
differences in their weapons systems and force structures.  The need to determine
balanced trades between different types of weapons systems often added months or
years to the negotiating process.  But this process ensured that the parties interacted
as equals – with an equal sense of security and an equal sense of sacrifice – in a way
that appeared to enhance strategic stability.  Furthermore, each nation acknowledged
that the size and structure of the other nation’s forces could affect its own security.
When the United States announced that it would reduce its nuclear forces
regardless of Russia’s response, as it did in September 1991 and as President Bush did
in November 2001, it indicated that the balance of forces between the two nations had
little or no relevance in security calculations.  Some view this as a positive
development. In 1991, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the United States no
longer needed to deploy ground-based nuclear weapons in Europe to deter or respond
to an attack there.  Similarly, in 2001, President Bush stated that Cold War is over
and the U.S. relationship with Russia has improved.  Therefore, the United States can
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reduce its forces without regard for the size or structure of Russia’s forces.  But some
in Russia view the absence of U.S. concern about Russia’s forces  as a negative
development.  With nuclear weapons as Russia’s last remaining measure of
superpower status, some see U.S. disregard for those weapons as a disregard for
Russia as a major nation.
Bilateral Treaties – Weaknesses
Length of negotiations.  Many analysts argue arms control negotiations
cannot keep up with either the weapons-planning process or changes in the
international environment.  When the START I negotiations began, the United States
and Soviet Union were adversaries in a tense relationship.   Two months after the
nations signed the Treaty, President Bush cancelled several weapons systems – such
as  the program to develop a mobile basing mode for the MX Peacekeeper missile and
the program to develop a small single-warhead mobile ICBM – that would have been
covered by the agreement.  And 6 months after signing the Treaty, in December 1991,
the Soviet Union ceased to exist.  At that time, many experts agreed that the number
of weapons permitted by START I was too high, particularly in light of growing
concerns about the command and control of these weapons and their safety and
security after the demise of the Soviet Union.   Many analysts saw the relatively quick
conclusion of START II, with the United States and Russia agreeing in less than one
year to reduce their forces by an additional 50%, as evidence that the arms control
process could move more quickly in a less adversarial environment.  However, that
Treaty faced long delays in the ratification process and had not yet entered in to force
at the end of 2001.  Yet many, including President Bush, believe the relationship
between the United States and Russia has improved enough to permit far deeper
reductions in their strategic offensive forces.
Length of Implementation.  START I allowed 7 years for the parties to
reduce their forces.  Although they eliminated many weapons more quickly than
mandated by the Treaty, neither the United States nor Russia completed their
eliminations until the deadline of December 5, 2001.  The START II Treaty initially
mandated that the United States and Russia complete their reductions by the
beginning of 2003, ten years after they signed the Treaty.  But, in September 1997,
after delays in the ratification process, the two nations agreed to extend the
elimination period to the end of 2007.  Russia sought this extension, in part, because
it did not have the resources to eliminate missile launchers and submarines as quickly
as would have been required to meet the earlier deadline.  In addition, many of
Russia’s aging systems would reach the end of their service lives by the end of the
decade and, with the later deadline, Russian officials could argue that START II
would not impose any undue burdens on the Russian military.  This point helped win
the approval of the Russian parliament in the vote to ratify START II.
Supporters argue that the lengthy implementation process is necessary because
it will take time for the nations to comply with the detailed elimination procedures and
it allows each nation to be certain that the other is meeting its obligations before it
eliminates its own weapons.  Critics argue, however, that this time-frame adds to
costs of nuclear weapons by forcing the nations to operate and maintain them when
they know they will eventually eliminate them.  Furthermore, in an era when the
United States is concerned about Russia’s degraded command and control structure,
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the United States should encourage a quicker elimination process, not one that allows
Russia to retain its aging systems for several additional years.
High Cost of Implementation.  The START Treaties contain detailed
provisions that outline procedures that parties must use when eliminating weapons or
converting them for other uses.  These provisions seek to ensure that the eliminated
weapons cannot be used again in the future.  For example, the United States and
Soviet Union agreed to destroy the launch tubes on ballistic missile submarines and
to excavate or explode ICBM silos to a depth of 8 meters under START I.  The
START II Treaty permits Russia to convert silos for SS-18 missiles to silos that hold
smaller single-warhead missiles, but the Treaty specifies that Russia must fill the
bottom of the silo with cement and install a metal ring around the top to ensure that
the remaining dimensions are too small to hold an SS-18 ICBM.  These provisions
also help the parties monitor the elimination process and verify compliance with the
Treaty.  But these procedures can be costly to implement.  For example, if the United
States wanted to use old ballistic missile submarines for other purposes, it could not
simply remove the ballistic missiles, fill or seal the launch tubes, and deploy the
submarines with other weapons.  It would have to cut out the portion of the
submarine with the launch tubes in it and replace it with another structure, or accept
that the warheads once carried on the submarine still counted under the Treaty.
Absence of Future Flexibility.  Most arms control agreements contain
provisions that allow a nation to withdraw from the Treaty so that it can protect or
enhance its national security.  Critics of formal arms control argue, however, that the
United States could remain locked into arms control agreements, regardless of its
national security needs, because it would be too difficult politically to withdraw from
the agreement.  They point to the U.S. experience with the ABM Treaty.  Even
though the Clinton Administration planned to deploy a missile defense system that
was inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, it did not exercise the U.S. right to withdraw.
Instead, it sought to convince Russia to accept a Protocol to the Treaty that would
modify and relax its restrictions.  The Bush Administration notified Russia of the
planned U.S. withdrawal from the ABM in December 2001, but it still spent months
seeking a mutual solution with Russia.
Unilateral Arms Reductions – Strengths
Speed in Decision-Making.  A Presidential decision to alter U.S. nuclear
forces is likely to be reached more quickly if the reductions will be implemented
unilaterally, rather than through a formal treaty.  The President would still seek
analyses and alternatives from the Department of Defense and other agencies, but,
without plans for formal negotiations, the U.S. government would not need to
develop a negotiating strategy and fall-back positions.  Most experts also agree that,
without the need to reach agreement with Russia on specific definitions or provisions,
the President could incorporate his decision into U.S. policy guidance in a relatively
short amount of time.  He could incorporate the changes into the annual budget for
the Department of Defense or announce them as a separate decision.
The United States might also begin to reduce its forces more quickly after a
unilateral decision because there would be no need for a formal approval from either
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the U.S. Senate or the Russian parliament.27  This process has added years to the
implementation of the START agreements.  For example, in late 1992, when the
Russian parliament approved ratification of the START I Treaty, it stated that it
would not exchange instruments of ratification and allow the Treaty to enter into
force until Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states.   Belarus and Kazakhstan took this step in 1993,
but the parliament in Ukraine delayed its action until late 1994, delaying START I’s
entry into force by almost 2 years.
The START II Treaty faced even greater delays due to the need for approval by
the Senate and the Russian Duma.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on START II in March 1993,  but delayed further debate until START I
entered into force.  Hearings resumed in early 1995, but a dispute over plans to
reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency delayed further action until January 1996, three years after Presidents Bush
and Gorbachev signed the Treaty.  The Russian Duma, began considering START II
in July 1995 but concerns about the Treaty’s effect on Russian forces and negative
reactions to other elements of U.S. foreign policy slowed the debate several times.28
When the Duma finally approved START II on April 14, 2000, it stated that the
Treaty could not enter into force until the United States ratified several 1997
agreements related to the 1972 ABM Treaty.  The Clinton Administration never
submitted these to the Senate, for fear they would be rejected, and, consequently,
START II has never entered into force.
Speed in Implementation.  When the United States alters its nuclear force
posture through unilateral reductions, without the  elimination provisions of a formal
treaty, the changes can take place relatively quickly, through standard military
practices. As was noted above, U.S. bombers and Minuteman II missiles were
removed from their alert status in a matter of days after President Bush announced he
would do so in September 1991.  Nonstrategic nuclear weapons were removed from
deployment in a matter of months.  Furthermore, the absence of concern for the size
or structure of Russian forces allows these changes to proceed without pause; there
is no need to ensure that the Russia has also met its obligations.
On the other hand, with unilateral reductions, the United States (or Russia) could
choose to implement the changes slowly.  This possibility affected the debate  in the
Russian Duma against the START II Treaty.  As time passed before the Treaty
entered into force, some in Russia argued that Russia did not have the resources to
eliminate its ballistic missile submarines and ICBM launchers by 2003.  If the Treaty
did not enter into force, Russia would still probably eliminate these weapons systems,
but it could do so more slowly.  After the United States and Russia agreed to extend
the elimination period in START II to the end of 2007, President Putin told the Duma
that Russia would not have to eliminate any of its older systems before the end of
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their service lives.  This argument reportedly swayed some members of the Duma and
convinced them to vote for START II.
Allows for “sweeping” change.  After President Bush announced the
withdrawal of U.S. land-based and sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons in 1991,
many analysts praised the measures because they would produce “sweeping” changes
in the U.S. nuclear posture.  The United States would withdraw and eliminate whole
categories of nuclear weapons; Russia pledged to do the same.  In contrast, some
have argued that, in a negotiating process where both sides seek to maintain a balance
and seek equivalent limits on their forces, formal arms control treaties only produce
changes at the margins of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.  This observation was
not universally true; the 1987 INF Treaty eliminated whole categories of nuclear
weapons (intermediate-range ground launched missiles) and the 1993 START II
Treaty called for a relatively deep 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive forces
and the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.  But, after 9 years of negotiations,  START
I would eliminate only a few thousand strategic warheads on each side.  The 1991
PNIs promised to eliminate the same number, or more, after just a few weeks of
consideration and consultation.
However, a broader analysis indicates that a similar dynamic may be at work in
both types of arms reductions.  A review of bilateral arms control treaties since the
early 1970s indicates that the United States and Soviet Union were not willing to
make deep reductions in their offensive nuclear weapons or eliminate entire categories
of weapons because both nations believed these weapons were needed to maintain
their national security.  They accepted modest limits on their forces because they were
not willing to make sweeping changes in their force postures as long as their
relationship remained tense and potentially hostile.  In the mid-1980s, when the
United States deployed and then, under the INF Treaty, withdrew intermediate-range
missiles from Europe, the atmosphere between the two nations had begun to change.
Many analysts believe that during the negotiations, both sides adopted a political
objective of improving their relationship.  This allowed each to accept the elimination
of weapons that had played as much of a political, as military role, in Europe in the
1980s.  The START I Treaty codified more modest changes, but, by the time START
II was negotiated in 1992, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.  Both nations
recognized that this change in the international security environment allowed more
sweeping political and military changes.  Hence, START II reduced forces more
deeply than START I.
Similarly, the 1991 PNIs were announced at a time when the changing
international security environment allowed for more robust changes in nuclear forces
than had been possible in the preceding years.  Many of the weapons withdrawn from
the U.S. arsenal were of little military utility after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviet Union, too, had a political incentive to withdraw its nuclear forces from
deployment areas in non-Russian republics to strengthen their control and security.
Hence, although the United States and Soviet Union may have eliminated a greater
number of weapons through unilateral measures than they did through bilateral
treaties, the “sweeping” nature of the changes was arguably more a sign of the times
than a result of the mechanism chosen for announcing the reductions.
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Taking Political Credit.  During most of the Cold War era, the concept of
“unilateral disarmament” had a strongly negative connotation in the United States.
It was often used in political discussions by one side when it wanted to accuse the
other side of undermining U.S. security by reducing or slowing the growth of U.S.
nuclear forces.  Nevertheless, the United States did alter its nuclear force deployments
and force posture during this time, often eliminating large numbers of older weapons
when a particular objective could be met with smaller numbers of new systems.  Other
systems, such as nuclear-armed air-defense missiles and nuclear-armed anti-ballistic
missiles, were also eliminated when they were deemed to be not cost-effective.  But
these changes occurred without public announcement, as a part of ongoing
modifications to the U.S. military posture.
In many ways, the unilateral reductions President Bush announced in 1991
resembled those that had been taken quietly throughout the Cold War era.  He
withdrew nuclear weapons that were no longer considered cost-effective.  The
shorter-range systems  in Europe could only reach targets in eastern European nations
that were no longer considered to be adversaries. In addition, the potential presence
of non-strategic nuclear weapons on U.S. naval vessels had led some allies, such as
New Zealand, to restrict U.S. access to naval bases on their territories.  Furthermore,
maintaining and training with those weapons placed a burden on U.S. military forces.
Even though changing political and military circumstances may have led to the
weapons’ withdrawal without a formal presidential announcement, President Bush
could still take credit for and win public praise for changing the U.S. nuclear posture.
The high public profile that accompanied the President’s televised speech in
September 1991 substantially changed the perception of unilateral arms reductions.
By removing thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons from overseas bases and
U.S. naval forces, and by reducing the alert rates for some U.S. strategic weapons,
President Bush had, according to some, broken through the slow pace of  negotiated
arms control, addressed concerns about security and control over Soviet non-strategic
nuclear weapons, and reduced the nuclear threat.
Flexibility.  In 1991, President Bush announced that many weapons would be
eliminated but others, including the sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, would be
retained in storage.  He said they could be returned to U.S. naval vessels if the need
arose.  This component of the PNI highlights one of the key characteristics of
unilateral reductions.  They provide the United States (and Russia) with the ability to
reverse the withdrawals and reductions if new threats emerge.  The United States or
Russia could withdraw from an arms control treaty to restore forces, but, as was
noted above, the political cost of doing so might seem prohibitive.
Unilateral reductions would also provide the United States and Russia with
flexibility in the timing of their reductions.  In 1991, the United States removed its
nuclear forces from alert in a matter of days and its non-strategic weapons from
deployment in a matter of months.  But these reductions do not have to be taken
quickly.  They could move more slowly to allow for renewed consideration of threats
and security needs or to coincide with the normal retirement schedule for a weapons
system.  Treaties, on the other hand, often set an arbitrary time line for weapons
eliminations, which can add to the costs and increase the complexity of the process.
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Unilateral Reductions – Weaknesses
Absence of Cooperative Monitoring Measures.  When President Bush
and President Gorbachev announced their intentions to withdraw and eliminate non-
strategic nuclear forces in 1991, they did not include any cooperative monitoring
measures in their proposals.  As they had for nearly 30 years, the two nations would
monitor the forces of the other nation with their own satellites and sensors – their
national technical means (NTM) of verification.  But they would not provide data on
the numbers and locations of weapons covered by the PNIs, they would not notify
each other when they planned to move those weapons, and they would not invite or
permit inspections at storage or deployment areas.  The United States and Russia did
discuss their progress in implementing the PNIs, and provide some data on the status
of their weapons, during the early 1990s, but this lacked the rigor of information
required by arms control treaties.
The absence of cooperative monitoring measures can reduce a nation’s
confidence in its knowledge and understanding of nuclear force deployments in the
other nation.  However, in an environment where the nations are willing to pursue
unilateral reductions, this reduced confidence may not be a problem.  President Bush
stated in 1991 that he would withdraw U.S. forces regardless of whether the Soviet
Union did the same.  Therefore, although the United States probably would have liked
precise information about the status of Soviet weapons, evidence that the Soviet
Union (and Russia) had not followed through on its own withdrawals should not have
affected the U.S. willingness to complete its reductions.
The improved U.S.-Russian relationship in the post-Soviet period  may have
further reduced the need for specific cooperative measures to monitor unilateral
reductions.  The United States and Russia have implemented a variety of different on-
site inspections and have provided each other with vast quantities of data under  the
START I Treaty.  They could extend these measures through the next decade, even
after completing START I implementation, to provide added information about the
status of the unilateral reductions.  Furthermore, representatives from the U.S.
government and U.S. industries are present at military facilities in Russia to implement
projects funded by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  Their
presence provides the United States with detailed information about the status of
some of Russia’s nuclear weapons.  However, the CTR program is not a complete
substitute for cooperative monitoring measures.  Russian officials do not have an
equivalent presence at U.S. facilities.
Difficulties in Verifying Compliance.  The ability to monitor forces and
activities in another nation is only part of what is needed to verify compliance with
arms control agreements.  Before one nation can determine whether the other nation
has met its obligations, it must have a clear understanding of the nature of those
obligations.  In bilateral treaties, this understanding is provided by the detailed
definitions, collateral requirements, and precise limits on forces covered by the Treaty.
Unilateral reductions often lack this precision. Even the best monitoring data cannot
answer questions of whether a nation has satisfied its obligations when there is
uncertainty about the steps required or when a nation is free to reverse its decision.
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This problem became evident in early 2001, when press reports indicated that
Russia had deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad.29  This enclave,
which is physically separate but politically a part of Russia, served as a major Soviet
military installation, and probably housed significant numbers of non-strategic nuclear
weapons prior to the 1991 withdrawals.  Russia denied that it had deployed nuclear
weapons to Kaliningrad in mid-2000, but the United States reportedly detected their
movement and presence with its satellite technology.30  The potential deployment of
Russian nuclear weapons in this enclave, which is surrounded by nations that will
become part of the European Economic Union, raised concerns among many U.S. and
European officials.  Some noted that Russia might be trying to pressure the EU and
NATO to contain their expansion plans.  
However, the United States and its allies in Europe had little legal recourse.
When President Gorbachev announced that he would move nonstrategic nuclear
weapons from deployment to storage areas, he did not indicate which category
applied to the facilities in Kaliningrad; regardless, he was under no legal obligation to
move weapons out of the enclave and he did not state that he would.  Even if the
weapons were moved to storage areas in Russia, that nation is under no legal
obligation to keep nuclear weapons out of Kaliningrad.  In the absence of well-
defined, legally binding obligations, Russia can store and deploy its nuclear weapons
at any site on its territory.
Potential for Destabilizing Reversal.  As is noted above, those who
support the use of unilateral measures, rather than bilateral treaties, to reduce nuclear
weapons argue that the flexibility permitted by these measures, and the ability to
reverse them if conditions warrant, is one of their key strengths.  However, reversing
the reductions can lead to uncertainty and instability.  The absence of well-defined
obligations and the absence of precise information about those forces can lead to
further uncertainties about deployments and intentions.  Furthermore, if one nation
feels threatened by the other’s actions, it, too, could choose to reverse its unilateral
measures.  If both nations then feel insecure or threatened, and both lack clear
information about the status of the other’s forces, the balance between the two could
be unstable, resulting in a “rearmament race” or escalation of a crisis.
Some analysts argue that the reversal of unilateral reductions should not prove
destabilizing in the current environment.  Because the nations chose to reduce their
forces regardless of the other’s force postures, an increase in the other’s forces would
not necessarily be seen as threatening.  Furthermore, the United States and Russia
maintain many channels for communication and, therefore, would be able to defuse
any crisis before it escalated.
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Review of the Bush Administration Proposal
As was noted above, President Bush announced that he would reduce U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next 10
years.  He stated that he would do this unilaterally, without codifying the reductions
in a Treaty, and that he hoped that Russia would make similar reductions.  The
remainder of this report reviews this proposal to determine how it incorporates the
strengths ands weaknesses identified above for unilateral arms reductions.
Strengths
Speed in Decision-Making.   When President Bush announced his decision
to reduce U.S. offensive nuclear weapons, he had been in office just over 9 months.
During the Presidential campaign and his first months in office, he had stated that he
would make this decision after the Department of Defense completed a review of U.S.
nuclear posture.  This study began in early 2001, and was scheduled to be completed
by the end of the year.  This time frame is significantly shorter than the 9 years of
negotiations on START I and a few months shorter than the year it took to complete
START II.  The time frame for beginning the President’s unilateral measures is further
reduced by the absence of the need for Senate advice and consent to ratification and
the approval of the Russian Duma.
Although the President announced his decision relatively quickly, many of the
force structure changes he may authorize have been under consideration for more than
7 years because they would have occurred if the START II Treaty had entered into
force.  These include the elimination of 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, the elimination or
conversion of 4 Trident ballistic missile submarines, and the downloading of all 500
Minuteman III ICBMs, so that they carry one, instead of 3 warheads.  The
Department of Defense approved these changes in the U.S. nuclear force structure in
1994, but the services have been unable to implement them because Congress
prohibited the use of funds for this purpose until START II entered into force.  Other
measures, such as the idea to count only operational weapons, rather than to use the
counting rules in START I and START II, have been under consideration since 1997,
when the United States and Russia agreed, in principle, to reduce their forces to
between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads in a future START III Treaty.
Speed in implementation.  President Bush has stated that the United States
will reduce its offensive nuclear forces over 10 years.  This time frame is longer than
the 7-year elimination period outlined in START I and equal to the 10 years initially
expected for START II.  Some of the changes in U.S. forces may occur relatively
quickly, over the next 3-4 years, but, as is noted above, the Department of Defense
has been waiting and preparing to make these changes for several years.
Several factors could slow the implementation of these reductions.  First, even
though the United States may not follow the complex elimination procedures outlined
in START I, the process of deactivating and dismantling nuclear weapons can still be
time-consuming.  Warheads must be removed, transported and secured in storage
areas.  Missile stages with highly explosive fuel must be handled carefully 
and stored safely.  The process of decommissioning or altering submarines so that
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they can perform other missions may also take several years.  Finally, the
Administration may plan to retain some weapons for a time, to assess changes in the
international security environment, and to reduce or eliminate them in future years.
Sweeping Change and Taking Credit.  After President Bush announced
his planned reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, analysts and observers
commented on the depth of the reductions that would be achieved by this initiative.
Some noted that it represented a reduction of two-thirds from current levels.31
However, as was noted above, the Department of Defense has planned for the
elimination of many the weapons covered by this initiative since 1994, when it
identified a force consistent with the START II Treaty.  In addition, in 1997,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the two sides would reduce their forces to
between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads under a prospective START III Treaty.  They
never reached agreement on the formal terms of a treaty, but the willingness they
demonstrated in 1997 indicates that the initiatives announced by the Bush
Administration do not represent “sweeping change” in thinking about the number of
nuclear weapons needed to safeguard U.S. national security.  
To the contrary, the President has stated that the United States will reduce its
forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads.  This
accounting is likely to exclude submarines that are in overhaul, and possibly some  of
the weapons on the bomber force that would have counted under the rules used to
attribute warheads to delivery vehicles under START I and START II.32  Depending
on how many delivery vehicles remain in the U.S. force, including these warheads in
the calculation could increase the accountable number of warheads to over 2,700.
Hence, the Bush proposal could result in fewer changes to U.S. forces than would
have been necessary if the United States had concluded a START III Treaty along the
lines of the 1997 framework.33
Nevertheless, because the Clinton Administration completed neither the
ratification process for START II nor the negotiations on a START III, President
Bush can take credit for implementing the reductions in U.S. forces.  He will not need
to seek the advice and consent of the Senate on a formal treaty, and he will not need
to wait for the Russian Duma to offer its approval.  Therefore, because Congess has
removed the prohibition on deactivation from the Defense Authorization Bill, he will
be able to begin to deactivate and dismantle strategic forces in FY2002.
Flexibility.  The President and many of his advisors have highlighted the fact
that unilateral reductions provide greater flexibility than bilateral treaties.  They often
note that the United States will be able to begin and complete the reductions more
quickly, eliminating weapons that are no longer needed for U.S. national security.
Some analysts who support the President’s approach have also argued that unilateral
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reductions provide the United States with the ability to increase its forces if conditions
change.  Although the President mentioned during his press conference with President
Putin that the United States would “destroy warheads” removed from U.S. nuclear
forces, this is not likely to happen in the near term.  According to Condoleezza Rice,
the President’s National Security Adviser, the United States is more likely to move
the warheads so that they are not “near the places at which they could be deployed...
Their capabilities will not be accessible to the United States.”34  But, she added, that
it will take a long time to remove the warheads from deployment and that their
ultimate disposition is unclear. They could remain in storage, as a part of the U.S.
stockpile, for many years.
The United States, in theory, could restore these warheads to its deployed
forces.  If the United States retained the force structure outlined in the Appendix, and
if it restored 3 warheads to each Minuteman III ICBM, 8 warheads to each Trident
SLBM on 14 Trident submarines, and between 12 and 20 nuclear-armed cruise
missiles to each B-52 bomber, it could build to a force of between 5,500 and 6,000
warheads on its strategic offensive nuclear weapons.  Although it is unlikely that the
United States  could restore a large number of warheads in a short period of time, it
might still be able to add several hundred warheads to its bombers or missiles in a
crisis.
Weaknesses
Cooperative Monitoring and Verification of Compliance.  The
President’s proposal does not include any special provisions to allow for cooperative
monitoring of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.  However, Administration officials
have stated that they are willing to implement cooperative measures, such as those
that have been included in past agreements, to allow monitoring and verification of
force reductions.35  As was noted above, the START I Treaty provides for a number
of on-site inspections that would end in the coming years.  The parties may agree to
continue with those inspections and to continue to discuss their concerns in the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) established by the Treaty.
Even if the United States and Russia continue to monitor reductions in their
forces with cooperative measures, questions could arise about compliance with the
obligations to reduce forces. The absence of precise definitions of terms like
“operationally deployed forces” and uncertainties about the eventual disposition of
warheads removed from operational forces could create misunderstandings and
disagreements.  Russia, in particular, may grow concerned about the size and status
of the remaining U.S. nuclear arsenal.  This may be of little concern in the current
environment where there is a cooperative relationship between the United States and
Russia.  The President’s proposal for unilateral reductions is premised on the fact that
nuclear weapons and arms control no longer serve as central features in the
relationship between the two nations.  Therefore, disagreements about the
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implementation of reductions in these weapons may not undermine or interfere with
cooperation in other areas of the relationship.
Some critics of the Administration’s approach argue, however, that the absence
of codified limits and restrictions, precise definitions, and verification provisions could
lead to disputes that might undermine the U.S.-Russian relationship.  Since the
positive relationship between the United States and Russia might change in the future,
such uncertainties and concerns could prove destabilizing.
Potential for Destabilizing Reversal.  In the past, Russian officials have
objected to arms control provisions that provide the United States with the ability to
increase its forces relatively quickly.  Specifically, they complained about the “upload
potential” that United States would have had under START II if it reduced its forces
by removing warheads from deployed missiles.  Similar criticism is likely if the United
States reduces its forces by removing additional warheads, instead of dismantling
missiles and submarines, and declares that weapons in overhaul should not count
against operational totals.  Russia could seek to balance this U.S. advantage by
increasing the warheads on its own ICBMs.  Russia’s new ICBM, the SS-27, has been
tested with only one warhead.  But many experts agree that Russia could retain its
older missiles and deploy the new SS-27 with 3 or 4 warheads if it feared that its
forces were declining more quickly and deeply than U.S. forces.  But, if Russia
deployed a greater number of warheads by retaining MIRVed ICBMs, U.S. officials
and defense planners might choose to restore warheads to the U.S. force to offset
Russia’s increase.
The Bush Administration has argued that the new relationship between the
United States and Russia has eliminated this type of calculation from the two nations’
force planning processes.  Neither nation needs to consider the forces of the other
when sizing its own forces.  Yet, critics have noted that, although this may be true in
the political relationship between the nations, it is not necessarily true among military
planners.  The U.S. military still appears to determine U.S. nuclear requirements with
consideration for the ability to deter Russia by threatening unacceptable damage
against a range of Russian targets.  And Russia still appears to consider U.S. nuclear
forces as a threat to its security.  According to some, the potential for instability could
increase as the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty and deploys missile
defenses that Russia might view as a threat to its offensive forces.  From Russia’s
perspective, the combination of robust missile defenses and uncertainty about the
potential number of operational warheads in U.S. offensive forces could lead to grave
concerns about Russia’s security and pressure within the Russian military for increases
in Russia’s deployed nuclear forces.36
Conclusion
Over the years, the United States and Russia have used both bilateral treaties and
unilateral reductions to reduce their nuclear forces.  On balance, it appears that
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unilateral measures may offer the opportunity for more rapid and comprehensive
reductions than bilateral treaties.  But treaties – with their precise definitions, detailed
restrictions, and cooperative monitoring provisions – may do more than unilateral
measures to promote and ensure stability.  Some argue that stability and predictability
are less important in the current environment than they have been in the past because
the relationship between the United States and Russia has improved and now reflects
cooperation and consultation across a much wider range of issues.  Others, however,
argue that this relationship could change in the future.  They argue that, if it does, a
comprehensive web of arms control agreements could provide predictability and
transparency to ease concerns about nuclear weapons.
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Appendix
 U.S. Nuclear Forces Under Arms Control Scenarios
START I
START I limits the United States and Russia to 6,000 warheads on 1,600
strategic offensive delivery vehicles, with no more than 4,900 warheads on land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Counting rules assign a number of
warheads to each type of missile and bomber.  The number of warheads assigned to
ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number actually deployed on that type of
missile.  But, bombers equipped with cruise missiles count as 10 warheads, even
though they can carry up to 20 weapons, and bombers not equipped with cruise
missiles count as one warhead, regardless of the number of weapons they can carry.,
The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of warheads
attributed and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles.
START I contains a 7-year implementation period, which ended on December
5, 2001.  The strategic nuclear forces that could remain in the U.S. arsenal appear on
Table 1 below.  This table calculates both the number of “attributed” warheads in the
force, using the Treaty’s counting rules, and the number of actual weapons that could
be carried by the listed weapons systems.















B-52H Bombers 94 940 1,880
B-1 Bombers(b) 91 91 0
B-2 Bombers 21 21 336
Total 1,188 5,952 7,116
Source: U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet.  CRS Estimates
(a) Some Minuteman III missiles have been downloaded to carry one or two
warheads; others still carry 3 warheads.




  START II limits the United States and Russia to 3,000-3,500 each on their
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The Treaty also bans all multiple warhead
ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under START I, the parties can reduce their deployed
warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by downloading, or removing, warheads
from deployed missiles.  But the parties can remove, at most, 4 warheads from each
missile, so ICBMs with 10 warheads must be eliminated, rather than downloaded.
The treaty makes an exception for the Russian SS-19 missile, which carries 6
warheads.  Russia can remove 5 warheads from 105 of these missiles so that they will
remain as single-warhead missiles.  Unlike START I, however, the counting rules for
START II do not “discount” the number of warheads on bombers; they count as the
number of weapons they are equipped to carry.  Consequently, there is no difference
between the number of attributed warheads and the number of actual warheads and
weapons on U.S. deployed forces.
The START II Treaty has not entered into force and the Bush Administration
has not indicated that it will complete the ratification process.  However, in 1994, as
a part of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense identified a force
structure consistent with the START II limits.  This appears on Table 2.  





Minuteman III ICBMs 500 500 500
Trident II missiles (a)
(14 submarines)
336 1,680 1,680
B-52H Bombers(b) 76 940 940
B-2 Bombers 21 336 336
Total 933 3,456 3,456
Source: Department of Defense, CRS Estimates
(a) This table assumes the United States would have “downloaded” the Trident missiles so that
each carried 5, rather than 8, warheads.
(b) B-52 bombers can carry 8, 12, or 20 nuclear-armed cruise missiles.  This table assumes
the aircraft in the force will carry combination of these numbers, for a total force of around
940 cruise missiles.
START III
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and
Russia would negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II entered into force.
This treaty would limit each side to between 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads
by December 31, 2007.  The parties also hoped that the new Treaty would use the
same counting rules and downloading rules for ballistic missiles as START I, and the
same counting rules for bombers as START II (i.e. bombers would count as the
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number of weapons they were equipped to carry).  Because START II never entered
into force, the United States and Russia never opened formal negotiations on START
III.  They held several rounds of informal discussions, but they remained far apart on
the details of the limits and provisions they wanted in the Treaty.
Table 3, below, illustrates a force structure for the United States that would have
been consistent with a limit of 2,500 warheads.  It assumes that the United States
would download its Trident SLBMs to carry 4 warheads, instead of 8 warheads,
consistent with the START I rule limiting the amount of warheads removed from a
missile to 4.  It also assumes that each B-52 bomber that could carry nuclear weapons
would be equipped to carry 12 cruise missiles.  The remainder of the B-52 bombers
would either be eliminated or converted so that they could only perform non-nuclear
missions.  The force structure in Table 3 eliminates some of each type of U.S. nuclear
weapon.  But this is just illustrative.  The United States could have retained more
bombers or ICBMs, for example, if it had eliminated more Trident submarines. 





Minuteman III ICBMs 350 350 350
Trident II missiles (a)
(12 submarines)
288 1,152 1,152
B-52H Bombers(b) 55 660 660
B-2 Bombers 21 336 336
Total 714 2,498 2,498
Source: CRS estimates
During discussions of the U.S. force for START III, the Air Force and Navy
expressed concerns about the options for reducing U.S. forces, particularly if START
III relied on the same counting rules as START I and START II.  The Navy did not
want to eliminate Trident submarines, and possibly consolidate its fleet at one base on
one ocean (they are currently deployed in Bangor, Washington and Kings Bay,
Georgia) because this would interfere with the submarines’ operations and their ability
to cover their targets.  The Air Force did not want to eliminate B-52 bombers because
they are often needed for conventional missions.  And it did not want to convert some
of the bombers so that they could not carry cruise missiles because the aircraft have
been used to launch conventional long-range cruise missiles in conflicts.  Both
services pressed for changes in the counting rules so that they could exclude some of
their delivery vehicles from the Treaty’s limits without altering or eliminating them.
Bush Administration Proposal 
By altering the measure of account for U.S. nuclear forces, from “attributed”
warheads to “operationally deployed” warheads, the Administration’s proposal
relieves the pressure that would have been imposed by START III to eliminate U.S.
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nuclear delivery vehicles.  Specifically, the United States could retain the same force
structure as it planned to deploy under START II.  
As Table 4, below, indicates, the Navy could retain all 14 Trident submarines
that had been planned for START II.  But the number of operationally deployed
warheads on those submarines could decline below START II levels.  For example,
without the START I provision that limits downloading to only 4 warheads from each
missile, the Navy could deploy Trident missiles with 3 warheads, instead of 8.  In
addition, the Navy could exclude Trident submarines in overhaul because they would
not carry any operationally deployed warheads.  Similarly, the Air Force could retain
all 76 B-52 bombers and reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads in its
force without altering any aircraft if it counted only operationally deployed long-range
nuclear-armed cruise missiles, rather than the total number of cruise missiles the
bombers were equipped to carry.  To bring U.S. forces below the 2,200 limit, the
Table below assumes that this number will decline to around 500 cruise missiles over
the next 10 years.
Table 4 also lists the number of warheads that would be attributed to identified
force structure if START counting rules were used to calculate warheads.
Specifically, this number includes all 14 Trident submarines, and counts 4 warheads
on each Trident missile.  It also attributes 12 cruise missiles to each of the 76 B-52
bombers.  If some of the bombers were equipped to carry 20 cruise missiles, this
number would be 1,520, rather than 912.  As is evident on the Table, the number of
warheads attributed to this force by START counting rules exceeds the number of
operationally deployed warheads by more than 500.






Minuteman III ICBMs 500 500 500
Trident II missiles (a)
(14 submarines)
336 864 1,344
B-52H Bombers(b) 76 500 912
B-2 Bombers 21 336 336
Total 933 2,200 2,756
Source: CRS estimates
(a) Although the launcher total includes all 14 Trident submarines, the warhead total excludes
the two submarines that would be in overhaul at any given time.  It calculates the number of
warheads on 12 submarines, if each missile is equipped with 3 warheads.
